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Throughout the series of international negotiations leading to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol, Germany, along 
with the European Union (EU), have been at the forefront of efforts to address the challenges of 
global warming. In October 1990, for example, the European Community (EC) adopted a target 
of stabilizing carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions at 1990 levels by the year 2000 – a position 
pushed, in part, by the German and like-minded European governments to give them greater 
influence in those international climate change negotiations. In advance of the third conference 
of the parties (COP3) to the FCCC, the European Union called for a 15 percent cut in CO2 
emissions by 2010. This EU target was based on a burden-sharing arrangement in which 
Germany was a major contributor—a 25 percent reduction in domestic CO2 emissions, which 
translated into an estimated 80 percent of total EU reductions. In the aftermath of the 
compromise reached at Kyoto, the burden-sharing arrangements negotiated within the EU called 
for Germany to undertake a 21 percent domestic cut in emissions of the basket of six greenhouse 
gases (GHGs) stipulated in the Kyoto Protocol.  
Clearly, Germany has been an important player in the global climate change negotiations 
and is central to the commitments assumed by the EU under the Kyoto Protocol – in the absence 
of substantial reductions of GHG emissions by Germany, the EU has little chance of meeting its 
international obligations. The core question to be addressed in this paper is the degree to which 
the EU has been able to influence the adoption and implementation of global climate change 
policy at the national level.  More specifically, using an analytic framework informed by the 
literature on “Europeanization,” the paper will first assess the extent to which membership in the 
EU has shaped German climate change policy. Attention will then turn to the identification of  
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mechanisms that help explain domestic change, taking care to separate the role of the EU from 
other potential influences.  
Europeanization and the Response to Global Warming 
  Seeking to disaggregate—and thereby better understand—the various influences on 
public efforts to address the challenges of global warming is a daunting task. The factors shaping 
the response to global climate change are complex and rarely uni-directional: multilateral 
arrangements negotiated at the international level may influence domestic responses; at the same 
time, national preferences, along with a country’s bargaining power, influence the negotiation of 
those agreements; scientific, business and environmental nongovernmental organizations 
organized domestically and transnationally seek to shape the preferences and influence the 
actions of governmental actors. There is an additional factor, however, that may have a 
significant impact on countries located in Europe—membership in the European Union. In an 
effort to better understand this particular element of the response to global warming, an analytic 
lens informed by the literature on “Europeanization” will be used to assess the extent to which 
the EU has influenced German climate change policy. 
  For the purposes of this paper, the concept of “Europeanization” is conceived as a 
process associated with domestic changes due to EU membership. Central to most studies 
attempting to explain the process of “Europeanization” is the “Goodness of Fit” proposition 
(Cowles/Caporaso/Risse, 2001; Radaelli, 2003). It hypothesizes that the greater the “misfit” 
between European policy or processes and their domestic counterparts, the greater the pressures 
for adaptation or change at the national level. The operative mechanism in this process has been 
termed “vertical” Europeanization: adaptive pressures are created from the clear demarcation  
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between the European level, where policy is defined, and the member states, where domestic 
arrangements must be brought into alignment (Radaelli, 2003:41,42). There are, however, other 
supplemental or mediating factors that may affect the Europeanization process. Among those 
most commonly found in the literature are:  
•  the presence/absence of multiple veto points (multiple veto points can help actors resist 
pressures for domestic change) (Börzel/Risse, 2003:58); 
•   a consensual policy style (this may help overcome veto points by making their use 
inappropriate) (Börzel/Risse, 2003:68);  
•  institutional arrangements that affect the relative strength of bureaucratic actors; and 
•  “horizontal” mechanisms such as regulatory competition or markets and EU fora that 
facilitate the diffusion of ideas and discourses (Radaelli, 2003:41-42). 
  The starting point for the analysis of German climate change policy is the “Goodness of 
Fit” proposition. To systematically assess whether pressures emanating from the EU have 
resulted in changes at the domestic level, the paper will first look at the extent of domestic 
change along two dimensions (Cowles/Caporaso/Risse, 2001; Wurzel, 2002; Featherstone and 
Radaelli, 2003): 
•  “Macro-level” changes—institutional  structure and policy style; 
•  “Policy-level” changes—policy content (e.g., setting of domestic targets/objectives) and 
policy instrument (e.g., command–and-control regulation, eco-taxes, emissions trading). 
That is, we will investigate the extent to which the choice of policy instruments and the setting of 
domestic targets/timetables, along with the possibility of changes in institutional structure and 
policy style, are influenced by the EU. Attention will then turn to possible supplemental or  
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mediating factors that help explain Europeanization—most importantly, the “vertical” or 
“horizontal” mechanisms discussed earlier. 
Policy Style and the Global Warming Debate in Germany 
  With historical roots in corporatist arrangements typiﬁed by close collaboration between 
the state and functionally organized interest groups (Beyme 1985; Katzenstein 1985), 
policymaking in Germany is said to be characterized by its emphasis on consensus and 
consultation (Jänicke and Weidner 1997; Wurzel 2002). This more collaborative approach to 
policymaking has been reflected in German climate change policy from its inception and 
continues to this day. 
  The global warming debate in Germany had its origins in the controversy over nuclear 
power triggered by the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear accident.
1 With calls for either an immediate 
shutdown (e.g., the Greens) or phase-out (e.g., Social Democratic Party or SPD) of all nuclear 
plants, the construction of additional coal-fueled power plants was proposed to compensate for 
the lost capacity of nuclear facilities. The parties supporting nuclear power—most importantly, 
the governing Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and its Bavarian sister party (Christian 
Socialist Union or CSU)—found in the issue of climate change what they hoped would be an 
effective counterbalance, arguing that nuclear power made good environmental sense when 
confronted with the ominous threats posed by global warming. Within the context of conflicting 
scientific claims and political polarization, it was decided to establish an Enquete (Inquiry) 
Commission—a parliamentary body occasionally created "to deal with complex and often 
politically sensitive issues" (von Moltke,1991:26). 
  The Enquete Commission on Preventive Measures to Protect the Atmosphere was created  
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in December 1987. The first interim report, Protecting the Earth's Atmosphere: An International 
Challenge (Enquete Commission,1989), was based on hearings with scientists, politicians, 
representatives from industry, and federal ministries as well as discussions with environmental 
and consumer groups.  It concluded that there was "an extraordinary need for action." ((Enquete 
Commission,1989:43). A subsequent report followed in October 1990. It found that 
  There is such massive and unequivocal scientific evidence on...the man-made 
greenhouse effect, the resulting climatic change and its repercussions...that there 
can be no doubt that preventive action must be taken immediately, irrespective of 
any need for further research. (Enquete Commission,1990:24) 
  The Enquete Commission continued to hold hearings and produce reports; however, its 
work was most crucial in the formative years of German climate change policy. The Enquete 
Commission, in essence, stepped in to ﬁll a political vacuum left by the political parties, interests 
groups and government agencies, none of which were prepared to deal with the global warming 
question, let alone provide leadership: 
•  During the early 1980s, the SPD was not receptive to a message about the possible dangers 
associated with CO2 emissions. In a party deeply divided over nuclear power, giving 
credence to the concerns about climate change threatened further division. Perhaps more 
importantly, strong ties to the powerful coal interests in Germany made for ready global 
warming skeptics. With Chernobyl, the party—out of federal office by this time—became 
more united in its rejection of nuclear power, but the global warming issue raised questions 
about the feasibility as well as desirability of a nuclear phase-out.  It was to take several 
years of internal debate to work out a position on global warming that to some degree 
reconciled the various environmental/anti-nuclear/pro-coal factions present in the party.  
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•  The CDU hesitated to take up the issue in the early 1980s—despite its strong support for 
nuclear power—because of its close links to industry and the implications of global warming 
for fossil fuel use. After Chernobyl, the CDU—along with the nuclear lobby—touted nuclear 
power as a solution to the problem, precisely because it did not emit CO2. If the real problem 
were CO2 being emitted into the atmosphere, however, regulatory measures resulting in 
lower CO2 emissions and/or higher prices for fossil fuels would seem to be the logical next 
step. The prospect of such actions initially found little support within important elements of 
the CDU/CSU, its FDP (Free Democratic Party) coalition partner, and industry. 
•  The Greens and major environmental groups came relatively late to the global warming 
problem, in large part because of the nuclear power issue. They had their formative roots in 
the anti-nuclear movement of the 1970s and owed much of their strength to an 
uncompromising rejection of nuclear power. They were less inclined to give much credence 
to the claims about global warming, especially since those claims were often associated with 
justifications for nuclear power. 
  The government, too, was ill-prepared to address the global warming issue. In 1981, a 
study by the German Council of Experts on the Environment—an independent body created to 
provide the government with scientific assessments of environmental questions—gave 
practically no credence to anthropogenic influences on world climate.  It was not until late 1987 
that the Council finally acknowledged the possibility of climate change due to CO2 emissions 
and other greenhouse gases (Hatch,1995:426).  In other words, government officials did not 
receive much early warning on the development of this issue through channels established for 
this purpose.  Perhaps more critically, however, the global warming question seemed to have  
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fallen between the institutional cracks of government during much of the 1980s. 
  The Federal Ministry for the Environment (BMU) had only come into existence 
in 1986 following Chernobyl and its (mis)handling by the Interior Ministry, where responsibility 
for most environmental issues had resided.  Climate change, however, was one of the areas 
outside the competence of the Interior Ministry.  Through its control of meteorological 
questions, the Transport Ministry had been given responsibility for the climate issue, where it 
was defined largely as a scientific question devoid of much political content. It was only after the 
ministry failed to provide for the effective participation of Germany in the initial deliberations of 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change—and the criticism that followed from the 
Enquete Commission—that the Chancellor's office transferred the climate issue to the BMU in 
late 1988. 
  In sum, it was within the framework of the Enquete Commission that the initial responses 
to climate change questions were formulated.  Prominent figures from the scientific community 
and leading parliamentarians—chosen not just for their expertise but also for their ties to 
important social groups (von Moltke,1991:27)—were brought together to deliberate. They were 
not simply agents of their political parties, interest groups or scientific bodies, however.  
Representatives from major industrial associations were consulted, studies were commissioned, 
politicians and ministry officials were heard, but Commission members set the tone and direction 
of deliberations. Out of this consultative process emerged a broad consensus for political action.  
  Following the release of the Enquete Commission's first report, the locus of activity 
gradually shifted towards government as attention began to focus on appropriate policy 
responses, but the consensual policy style has continued: an interministerial working group was  
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created in June 1990 to formulate the first national program to reduce German GHG emissions; 
the German Emissions Trading Group—composed of a representatives from federal and state 
governments, parliament, industry, and environmental groups—was established in October 2000 
the face of a controversial European Commission proposal for an emissions trading system; in 
2006 and 2007, a series of “Energy Summits” to bring together important stakeholders in the 
debate surrounding the intersection of energy policy and climate change. In sum, there has been 
little change in the consensual nature of German policy style. 
Institutional Structure and Climate Change Policy  
  As attention shifted to the appropriate government response to climate change, the 
substance of the debate centered on two questions: by what amount should Germany reduce its 
CO2 emissions and what methods should be used to achieve the agreed target?  In addressing 
these questions, however, fundamental issues related to institutional structure arose, due in large 
part to the nature of the climate change issue itself: no single government ministry could control 
climate change policy, each ministry had different organizational responsibilities and 
constituencies, and—with coalition governments the norm in Germany—ministers frequently 
had different party affiliations.  
  The two major protagonists in governmental efforts to formulate a policy toward global 
warming were the BMU, which was the lead ministry in the climate change issue, and the 
Ministry for Economics (BMWi), where the responsibility for energy policy resided. As will be 
illustrated the in the following sections on policy content and instruments, little has changed in 
the institutional structure shaping climate change policy; these two ministries have remained at 
the center of the policy process from the late 1980s to the present.   
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Policy Content: Targets and Timetables for GHG Reductions  
  International negotiations on a climate change agreement began in the early 1990s. A 
central issue in those negotiations was whether a binding target and timetable (stabilization of 
GHG emissions at 1990 levels by the year 2000) should be included in the treaty. As part of an 
effort to hammer out a national position on the question of CO2 emissions reductions and the 
timeframe within which the agreed target should be achieved, the BMU called for a 25 percent 
reduction in CO2 emissions by the year 2005. This was much higher than what energy experts in 
the BMWi believed possible or desirable given their constituents in the energy sector and 
industry.  The Economics Minister opposed binding targets because of concerns about the loss of 
economic flexibility and dynamism in energy security and competitiveness. In June 1990, the 
federal cabinet adopted the goal favored by the BMU: a 25 percent reduction in CO2 emissions 
by the year 2005 compared to 1987 levels. At the same time, the BMWi called for the early 
inclusion of eastern Germany in the calculations, since the former German Democratic Republic 
had been so inefficient in its energy use—a position opposed by the BMU because it would 
weaken the 25 percent target. A subsequent cabinet decision designed to accommodate BMWi’s 
views extended the reduction target to 25-30 percent by the year 2005 in light of German 
unification.
2  
  In October 1990, the European Community adopted a target of stabilizing CO2 emissions 
at 1990 levels by the year 2000. Though considerably weaker than the German target, it was 
hoped that this unified position would provide European governments greater leverage in the 
international negotiations. Ultimately, non-binding language on targets and timetables was 
included in the Framework Convention on Climate Change signed at the Rio Summit in 1992.  
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The ﬁrst session of the conference of the parties (COP1) to the FCCC was held in Berlin 1995. 
At the top of the agenda for COP1 was a review of the adequacy of the commitments contained 
in the climate change convention. Out of this review came the so-called Berlin Mandate which, 
in acknowledging that current commitments were inadequate, called for the negotiation of more 
ambitious commitments, hopefully by COP3 in 1997.  
Among the issues to be resolved in the negotiations leading up to COP3 were the 
reduction targets and the timeframe for achieving them. In March 1996, Germany proposed a 
reduction target of 10 percent by 2005 and 15–20 percent by 2010 (Oberthür and Ott 1999: 116). 
At the same time, efforts were made within the EU to formulate a common position. Initial 
discussions focused on an Irish proposal for a 5–10 percent reduction in CO2 emissions by 2005. 
Given the role of nuclear power in its energy mix, France argued for reductions based on per 
capita emissions. Germany, for its part, pushed for a 20 percent reduction in CO2 emissions, 
fearing that a low common target would weaken the EU’s position in the international 
negotiations. Most other member states supported a less ambitious target for the EU. Greece, 
Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Sweden (because of a planned phase-out of nuclear power) asserted 
their right to increase domestic CO2 emissions.  
  In the March 1997 meeting of the EU’s Environmental Council, a common negotiating 
position was hammered out. It called for a 15 percent reduction in emissions by 2010, though a 
precise burden-sharing arrangement was not agreed to at the time. Germany, however, 
committed to reductions that would cover approximately 80 percent of the EU’s overall target. 
Following the adoption at Kyoto of an 8 percent reduction target for a basket of six GHGs by 
2008–12, a modiﬁed burden-sharing agreement was accepted by EU environmental ministers in  
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June 1998. Germany’s share translated into a 21 percent reduction in the Kyoto Protocol’s basket 
of GHGs. (see Hatch, 2007:49-50). 
All told, the initial effects of Europeanization on Germany’s approach to targets and 
timetables were limited. Reduction targets for CO2 were domestically generated, though the 
ambition of those targets did lead Germany to push for an assertive EU position on targets and 
timetables in the international negotiations. In addition, once the Kyoto Protocol was ratiﬁed, 
Germany’s emissions reductions would no longer simply be a national statement of intent, but 
part of the EU’s legally binding commitment to reduce GHG emissions.  
The Choice of Policy Instruments  
  Among the initial measures adopted by the German government to help meet its national 
emissions reduction target were the 1991 Electricity Feed Act compelling utilities to purchase 
electricity generated from renewables at a subsidized rate, the Waste Avoidance and Waste 
Management Act, and the Ordinance on Heat Insulation, which mandated insulation standards 
for new buildings (see Hatch,1995:431-32). All represented the type of approach that typically 
characterized German environmental regulation: a so-called “command-and-control” regulatory 
approach. These instruments also represented the type of regulation increasingly criticized by 
industry for its inefficiency, high cost and adverse impact on competitiveness (Hatch, 2005:2-3).  
  In 1994, the BMU published a report which found that CO2 emissions had declined by 
14.7 percent between 1987 and 1993 (BMU,1994:10). At the same time, however, it concluded 
that these reductions were due largely to the effects of unification: inefficient energy use in the 
former East Germany—combined with its reliance on lignite (70-80 percent of primary 
energy)—meant that the shift to other fuels and their more efficient use reduced CO2 emissions  
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substantially; the collapse of the economy in the East led to lower CO2 emissions as well. The 
inference drawn from these developments was that the measures approved up to that point would 
fall well short of the government’s reduction goal of 25-30 percent by 2005 unless additional 
actions were undertaken (BMU,1994a:87). 
In the months leading up to COP1 in Berlin, efforts to put in place the set of measures felt 
necessary to achieve the Germany’s target encountered several hurdles, not the least of which 
was industry's resistance to additional regulatory measures. In an attempt to overcome a political 
impasse, an additional instrument was proposed—one that also came from Germany’s traditional 
policy toolbox and drew upon the consensual nature of German policymaking: voluntary 
agreements between the federal government and industry to limit CO2 emissions. 
Voluntary Agreements 
  Negotiations between industry and representatives from the BMU and BMWi began in 
January 1995. Among the major points of contention were the explicitness of the commitments, 
how demanding they should be, and what concessions government would provide in return.  
German industry was most concerned about a proposed Heat Utilization Ordinance for 
industrial companies (as well as a possible CO2/energy tax, to be discussed shortly). If adopted, 
the ordinance would have required companies to recover and utilize heat generated in their plants 
and make surplus heat available to others, an expensive process that—in the eyes of industry—
would severely compromise its competitiveness. It wanted these measures off the table. The 
government, for its part, wanted high absolute targets representing reductions that moved well 
beyond business as usual. Industry favored "specific" rather than "absolute" targets—reductions 
calculated on a per unit of output basis ("specific") rather than in lower overall emissions  
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("absolute").  
In March 1995, the "Declaration by German Industry and Trade on Global Warming 
Prevention" was issued. In this declaration, 15 industry associations agreed to use "special 
efforts" to reduce their specific CO2 emissions or specific energy consumption up to 20 percent 
by the year 2005 (base year of 1987). The government agreed to hold in abeyance additional 
regulatory measures (such as the Heat Utilization Ordinance) and CO2/energy tax. While 
welcomed by many concerned about the absence of action on global warming, the agreement 
was not without its critics (e.g., Fischedick, et al.,1995; Kohlhaas, et al.,1995). 
In response to such criticism, further negotiations between government and industry 
resulted one year later in a revised agreement that pledged to reduce specific CO2 emissions by 
20 percent, with a change in the base year from 1987 to 1990, which brought it into conformity 
with the base year employed in the FCCC negotiations while, at the same time, making it more 
ambitious, since many of the “wall fall” benefits from unification would be lost. Moreover, some 
of the associations switched their commitments from specific to absolute emissions reductions. 
Also, additional industrial associations joined, meaning that approximately 80 percent of 
German industry's total energy consumption was now covered by the agreement.  Finally, a 
monitoring system—to be administered by an independent third party (the Rhine-Westphalia 
Institute for Economic Research)—was established to provide greater transparency in evaluating 
compliance with the agreement.  
While in opposition, the SPD and Green party had been critical of the CDU/FDP 
government's over-reliance on voluntary measures. Following elections in 1998 that brought a 
center-left coalition into power, there were questions about the commitment of this new  
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SPD/Green government to the voluntary agreements. As it turned out, the coalition agreement 
negotiated between the SPD and Greens following the elections included a statement supporting 
their use.  
Discussions on revisions to the voluntary agreements began in earnest during the first 
months of 2000. Around the same time (March 2000), the Council of Environmental Advisors 
announced that the government would not be able to achieve its emission reduction goals unless 
additional efforts were undertaken, a fact subsequently acknowledged in statements by both the 
Ministers of Economics and the Environment. In October 2000, one month before negotiations 
on the Kyoto Protocol were to resume at COP-6 in the Hague, the government announced a 
further iteration in Germany's Climate Protection Program (BMU,2000).  
Within the context of the new national Climate Protection Program, a general agreement 
on further voluntary actions was signed between the government, the Federation of German 
Industry, and individual industrial associations in November. It committed industry to specific 
CO2 reductions of 28 percent by 2005 (the earlier agreement had set the target at 20 percent) and 
a 35 percent reduction in emissions of Kyoto gases (expressed in CO2 equivalents) by 2012 
compared to what they were in 1990. It was estimated that this would result in an additional 10 
million ton reduction in CO2 emissions by 2005 and a further 10 million tons CO2 equivalent by 
2012 (BMU,2000). Negotiations with individual industrial associations were to follow. The most 
significant agreement was between the power sector and federal government: in accordance with 
the target established for the energy sector in the Climate Protection Program, the utilities 
committed to a 45 million ton reduction in CO2 emissions by 2010, 20 million tons of which 
were to come from cogeneration (Hatch, 2005:114-17).   
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In sum, resort to voluntary agreements was rooted largely in domestic conditions and 
didn’t move beyond the tradition repertoire of policy instruments. 
Renewable Energy 
As indicated earlier, one of the first measures adopted by the German government to 
reduce GHG emissions was the 1991 Electricity Feed Act, which required utilities to purchase 
electricity generated from renewables at a subsidized rate. As part of an effort to place its own 
stamp on German climate change policy and to encourage the expansion of renewable energy, 
Red-Green coalition introduced the Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG) in April 2000. In the 
wake of this legislation, Germany experienced an accelerated growth in the generation of power 
from renewables. The most impressive area of growth has been in wind power. Between 
1991and the implementation of the EEG in 2000, Germany had achieved an installed capacity of 
4,500 MW. By the end of 2001, capacity had almost doubled to approximately 8,750 MW (BMU 
2002: 14). At the beginning of 2003, over 12,000 MW of electricity were being generated by 
wind power, representing 3.5 percent of all electricity consumption in Germany. In relation to 
other countries, this level of production translated into one-third of the world’s wind power, 
making Germany the single largest producer, with the US and Spain following at 25 and 15 
percent respectively.  
All told, the proportion of electricity from renewables increased from 5.2 percent in 1998 
to over 10 percent in 2004. The announced goal of the government was to have this share rise to 
12.5 percent by 2010. Over the longer term, the government set targets of 20 percent of 
electricity from renewables by 2020 and one-half of all energy by 2050. Though significant in 
terms of efforts to address climate change, these developments had little to do with the  
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Europeanization process. 
CO2/Energy Tax and Ecological Tax Reform 
  In the months following the adoption of national reduction targets in 1990, debate over 
the means to achieve this target focused, for the most part, on the application of a CO2 /energy 
tax and its linkage to a proposed EC-wide climate protection tax. The BMU favored the adoption 
of a tax or levy, even in the absence of agreement at the EC level. The BMWi opposed a CO2 
levy, especially if it were undertaken unilaterally. 
   In September 1991, the EC Commission released a draft paper containing a set of 
proposals designed to achieve the stabilization target adopted the previous year. As part of this 
package, the Commission proposed a combined CO2/energy tax that would be linked to 50 
percent energy content and 50 percent carbon content. In response, European industrialists 
unleashed an intense lobbying effort in opposition (The Economist, 9 May 1992:19,85). It had an 
impact. The revised proposal of the Commission made any EC energy tax conditional on other 
OECD countries adopting similar measures.   
Within the internal debate over global warming policy, the BMU had become the major 
proponent of Germany playing a leadership role in the international fight against global climate 
change. In the case of a CO2 tax/levy, this meant Germany going it alone if necessary. For the 
BMWi, there should be no such role. If the German economy were to retain its economic com-
petitiveness, there was no alternative to an EC-wide agreement. Up to mid-1991, the BMU had 
enjoyed the support of the Chancellor in the various interministerial struggles surrounding the 
global warming question. With economic growth slowing and the costs of German unity 
mounting, however, the BMU began to receive less backing from Chancellor Kohl and others in  
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the CDU. In December 1991, it was decided that the government would adopt a CO2 tax only in 
combination with an EC-wide CO2/energy tax.  
  In sum, proposals within Germany and the EC to adopt a CO2/energy tax met with little 
success. In the absence of consensus on the efficacy of this policy instrument among the major 
protagonists in this policy debate domestically, the decision by the Commission to link an EC 
energy tax to a broader adoption within the OECD provided the pretext for abandoning a 
CO2/energy tax at that time. By the mid-1990s, however, some type of tax designed to address 
the climate change problem had made its way back onto the domestic agenda. 
Support for an “ecological” tax reform had been building in Germany as economic 
growth stagnated and unemployment rose during the 1990s. Proponents argued that an 
ecological reform of the tax system could provide a “double dividend”: environmental objectives 
could be achieved more efficiently through this market-based instrument while at the same time 
reducing the high cost of labor for companies, thereby encouraging economic expansion and job 
growth. The eco-tax reform was to be revenue-neutral in that increased taxes on energy would 
compensate for reductions in company social security contributions. Following the election of 
the red-green coalition in 1998—and several months of negotiations among coalition partners 
and various stakeholders—an eco-tax came into effect on 1 April 1999, gradually raising the 
price on gasoline, heating oil, natural gas and electricity in a series of steps.  
Reﬂecting the inﬂuence of various interest groups and the need to get sufficiently broad 
support for this unilateral action, the government had to make several concessions: the 
consumption of coal was exempted and certain energy-intensive sectors were made eligible for 
reduced tax rates. In addition, electricity from renewables received only limited exemptions  
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despite the desire to encourage the development of this type of energy source. These limitations 
on renewables, however, had more to do with EU requirements governing competition in a 
liberalizing European electricity market (to be discussed later). The ﬁnal increment in the eco-
tax was introduced in early 2003 (see Kohlhaas and Meyer 2005).  
Emissions Trading 
The protocol signed at Kyoto in December 1997 was a far-from-complete document. Left 
for later negotiations was the task of ﬂeshing out the practical details required for its effective 
functioning. The magnitude of that task soon became apparent, as talks dragged on for another 
four years. Among the most contentious issues was the extent to which the “ﬂexible 
mechanisms” accepted at Kyoto (i.e. emissions trading, along with joint implementation/JI and 
the Clean Development Mechanism/CDM) could be used to meet the reduction targets adopted 
in the protocol.  
Going into the negotiations, Germany and the EU had emphasized the importance of 
industrialized countries taking the lead in emissions reductions, meaning that those reductions 
should come primarily from domestic measures. The US, along with such countries as Australia, 
Canada and Japan argued for maximum ﬂexibility in the use of instruments, thereby lowering the 
costs of meeting reduction targets. The compromise at Kyoto resulted in acceptance of the 
ﬂexible mechanisms, but their use was supposed to be ‘supplemental’ to domestic action. In 
subsequent negotiations, Germany sought to ensure that the ﬂexible mechanisms were, in fact, 
supplemental to domestic reduction measures. Domestic factors played a central role in shaping 
this priority.  
The position—that Germany and other industrial countries must take the lead in  
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combating climate change, and that this requires ﬁrst and foremost domestic action—was based 
largely on concerns about economic competitiveness. Though a signiﬁcant share of Germany’s 
ambitious reduction targets had come from ‘wall fall’ effects, the mix of policy instruments 
applied to the mitigation of climate change has imposed substantial ﬁnancial burdens on the 
domestic economy—reductions in GHG emissions from renewable sources, for example, are 
relatively expensive (Michaelowa 2003: 41). That the Kyoto Protocol might allow other indus-
trialized countries to avoid domestic actions, thereby gaining competitive advantages in 
globalizing markets, has been central to the calculations of the German government in the 
negotiations.  
In preparation for the negotiating session at COP6 in November 2000, Germany, in 
conjunction with several other EU member states and the European Commission, were 
successful in having the EU adopt a position calling for a 50 per cent ceiling on the use of 
ﬂexible mechanisms.  
As it turned out, the differences over limits on the use of flexible mechanisms proved 
unbridgeable. Following the withdrawal of the United States from the Kyoto Protocol in March 
2001, the talks assumed a new dynamic. Negotiations resumed in July 2001 and a text was 
ﬁnalized at COP7 the following November. Since the conditions of ratiﬁcation gave the 
countries previously aligned with the U.S. considerable leverage, the EU made the major 
concessions required to get an agreement: no concrete ceilings were imposed on the use of 
ﬂexible mechanisms.  
During negotiations on the Kyoto Protocol in 2001, debate at the European level began to 
intensify over a directive being drafted by the European Commission for an emissions trading  
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scheme in the EU. In general terms, German concerns about emissions trading in Europe 
mirrored to some degree those surrounding the Kyoto instruments. In a number of member states 
(e.g. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain), emissions trends in 
recent years had raised serious questions about those countries’ ability to meet their announced 
targets. From Germany’s perspective, additional domestic action was required if questions of 
competitiveness were to be avoided (BMU 2000: 152). The concerns became more speciﬁc with 
the publication of a draft directive in October 2001.  
Among the most contentious issues for Germany were the imposition of mandatory 
quotas on CO2 emissions in selected industrial sectors and the level of permitted cuts. German 
industry was especially opposed to the draft, arguing that it imposed additional burdens that 
would further threaten its competitiveness. The BMWi, in turn, became the major advocate for 
industry’s position within the government. While earlier expressing reservations about emissions 
trading, the Green Party and environmental nongovernmental organizations now supported the 
proposal (Michaelowa 2003: 37). Among the speciﬁc changes sought by the government were 
recognition of actions undertaken by Germany since 1990 in the allocation of emissions permits; 
the free distribution of emissions permits on a permanent basis; compatibility with the ﬂexible 
mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol, and a ‘pooling’ arrangement that would require sector-wide 
emissions quotas rather than the allocation of permits at the plant level (i.e. acceptance of a 
format compatible with the existing voluntary agreements).  
The compromise agreed to at a meeting of the Environmental Council in December 2002 
reﬂected the inﬂuence of Germany in the deliberations: acknowledging early efforts, 1990 could 
be used as the base year for the allocation of emissions permits; member states would be able to  
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distribute those permits free of charge through 2012; emissions credits from JI and CDM 
projects could be sold on the European emissions market; permits could be allocated on the basis 
of earlier voluntary agreements between government and industry; certain sectors and companies 
could apply to opt out of emissions trading until 2008; and, in a modest concession made by the 
German government, companies would be permitted (rather than required) to pool their 
emissions rights (Press Statement 2002; Süddeutsche Zeitung, 10 December 2002). In sum, 
though the German government played a central role in shaping the final version of the 
Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), the EU was clearly the driving force behind its adoption (for  
more detail, see Bang/Vevatne/Twena, 2007). 
Factors Shaping the Europeanization of German Climate Change Policy 
  As many of the policy studies in the Europeanization literature suggest (Radaelli, 
2003:36), there is little indication that Europeanization has occurred in terms of policy style and 
institutional structure. That is, the Europeanization process appears to have had little impact on 
the central elements of Germany’s political structure or policy style. This is perhaps best 
explained through the “goodness of fit” argument. That is, there have been few pressures on 
institutions or policy style to adapt due to the absence of a “misfit” between European-level 
processes and institutions and those found at the domestic level. The European approach to 
climate change more-or-less reflects the influence of Germany (and like-minded member states) 
who had pushed for progressive positions on climate change within the EU. The policy style and 
institutional arrangements that contributed to the adoption of ambitious targets and measures 
domestically, at the same time, meant that little structural adaptation was necessary. At the 
policy level, however, considerable Europeanization appears to have occurred in Germany.  
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  From an initial emphasis on regulatory measures that encountered strong resistance from 
industry and adamant opposition to market instruments, we have seen a grudging acceptance of 
such instruments due, at least in part, to the EU. The most significant example in this regard is 
the “vertical” Europeanization that occurred through the EU directive on emissions trading. This 
directive compelled German stakeholders to reorient their approach to climate protection policy. 
As a consequence of the ETS, the German government was now required to submit a national 
allocation plan to the EU which, for the first time, established emissions quotas for 2600 
industrial firms and utilities in Germany. In the initial allocation period (2005-2007), there was 
an overly generous allocation of permits for German industry. For the second period (2008-
2012), the initial draft plan submitted by the German government to the European Commission 
in June 2006 called for annual allowances totaling 482 million tons (mt). The Commission was 
highly critical of that goal. When emissions totals for 2005 (474 mt) were released later in 2006, 
the position of the German government became untenable. It announced a revised figure of 465 
mt in November 2006, but the Commission said this goal was too weak as well. The Commission 
subsequently approved an annual allocation of permits for Germany that may not exceed 453.1 
mt. Despite strong objections from German industry as well as the government, the competence 
of the European Commission in setting this binding cap on CO2 emissions in Germany was 
reaffirmed by the eventual (sullen) acceptance of the German government. 
  Domestic factors—most importantly, the 1998 change in government—best explain the 
introduction of the ecological tax reform in Germany. Other factors associated with the 
“horizontal” form of Europeanization, however, played a role as well. The possibility of 
CO2/energy tax had been discussed at the EU level for at least a decade. Moreover, most  
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European countries have used, or plan to use some form of taxes in their environmental policy 
(Kohlhaas and Meyer, 2005). The EU, in other words, has provided a forum where information 
and experience have been exchanged. In terms of the design of the tax reform, other mechanisms 
associated with the EU have played a role as well. Concerns about maintaining competitiveness 
in open markets account for the concessions made to the energy-intensive sectors. Electricity 
from renewable sources received only limited exemptions from the eco-tax because of the EU-
principle of nondiscrimination—a principle upheld by the European Court of Justice in a case 
where Finland had attempted to tax imports of electricity (Kohlhaas and Meyer, 2005:132-33).    
  Finally, though the ambition of the targets and timetables adopted by Germany was due 
largely to domestic factors, EU membership has made its reduction target under the Kyoto 
Protocol legally binding. With the Protocol coming into force in 2005, Germany is now legally 
obligated to reduce its GHG emissions by 21 percent, the amount established in the burden-
sharing agreement of the EU. 
Conclusion  
  Germany has been at the forefront of efforts to meet the challenges of climate change. 
Domestically, its program to reduce GHG emissions has been among the most ambitious in the 
world. It also has been a central actor in shaping Europe's approach to climate change and a key 
to the successful implementation of the EU's international commitments. At the same time, 
Germany’s approach to climate change has been influenced by the EU. The process of 
Europeanization, most importantly in the areas of policy instrument and content, appears to have 
become increasingly salient. This is reflected most graphically in the EU’s emission trading 
system, which has assumed a central role in Germany’s efforts to combat the threat of global  
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climate change.  
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Notes 
 
1  For a discussion of early developments in the climate change issue, see Hatch (1995:420-21) 
and Cavander and Jäger (1993). For detailed accounts of the controversy surrounding nuclear 
power in Germany, see Hatch (1986,1991,1996). 
2  One further modification was adopted just prior to the first meeting of the parties to the FCCC 
in 1995: the base year was changed from 1987 to 1990, thus bringing it into conformity with that 
employed in the international negotiations; the target was again set at 25 percent (rather than 25-
30 percent).  
 